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ABSTRACT 
Estimation of economic voting models is complicated by the possibility 
that voters treat certain economic conditions as "politically irrelevant" 
and do not attribute responsibility for such conditions to the incumbent 
party. Kramer (1983) suggested that this phenomena could account for the 
discrepancy between micro survey and aggregate time-series estimates of the 
economic voting model. Statistical methods are developed for testing the 
Kramer hypothesis and applied to presidential voting data from 1956 to 1984. 
With proper treatment, the estimated individual level income effect based on 
pooled cross-sectional surveys is as large as that found in aggregate time 
series data, Ordinary regression estimates are shown to be biased by a 
factor of approximately seven. It is also shown that ordinary regression 
estimates tend to overstate "sociotropic" or national level economic 
effects. Nonetheless, even using consistent estimation techniques, 
sociotropic effects are still found, though they are slightly smaller than 
the individual level effects. 
1 . INTRODUCTION 
MICROECONOMICS AND MACROPOLITICS: 
A SOLUTION TO THE KRAMER PROBLEM 
Douglas Rivers 
California Institute of Technology 
The connections between micro-level findings on voter behavior and the 
performance of elections as instruments for popular control over public 
policy have long been recognized. Early voting studies found most voters to 
be poorly informed about party and candidate differences and, occasionally, 
these findings were interpreted as proving the inefficacy of elections as a 
device for controlling policy-making. These arguments were strongly 
rebutted, albeit in rather different ways, by Downs (1957) and Key (1966), 
who proposed the retrospective voting model. Downs and Key pointed out 
that voters with little information about alternative policies could still 
vote in such a way as to give parties incentives to produce "desirable" 
policy outcomes. A voter needs not understand policy alternatives, Downs 
and Key observed, to decide whether he or she likes the policy outcome. 
By passing judgment retrospectively, they argued, voters with limited 
information could still influence macropolitical outcomes in a 
reasonable way. 
In a chapter still worth reading, the authors of the The American 
Voter noticed a tendency of voters, especially those belonging to the party 
out of power, to disapprove of the administration's handling of economic 
policy if they had experienced some economic hardship. (Campbell et al., 
1960, pp. 386-393) It remained, however, for G erald Kramer (1971) to provide 
an empirical basis for the retrospective voting model. Using aggregate time-
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series data on congressional and presidential elections from 1896 to 1964, 
Kramer showed that most of the fluctuations in aggregate vote totals could 
be explained by a simple retrospective voting model based on a few 
macroeconomic indicators. Kramer showed that despite the existence of 
strong social and psychological ties between voters and parties found in 
micro survey data, inter-election vote swings exhibited a regular and 
understandable relation to the economic performance of presidential 
administrations. 
Inevitably Kramer's analysis attracted the attention of survey analysts. 
Florina (1978) and several others, using respondents' self assessments of 
their family's financial situation, tried to find evidence of voters' 
assessments of their personal economic situation affecting their voting 
behavior. Surprisingly, there appeared to be, at best, a weak relationship 
between a voter's personal financial situation and his or her support for 
congressional candidates belonging to the president's party. Kinder and 
Kiewiet (1979) offerred an explanation for the discrepancy between the 
strong aggregate level relation between economic conditions and voting and 
the weak micro level relation. Instead of responding" to their personal 
economic situation, they argued, voters base their evaluations of incumbents 
on aggregate economic conditions. In a strongly worded conclusion, Kinder 
and Kiewiet argue the "political irrelevance of personal economic grievances": 
Private economic experience is important, but not for politics. 
Economic discontents and political judgments inhabit separate 
mental domains. (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979: p. 523) 
Instead, they say, voters are "sociotropic": 
In reaching political preferences, the prototypic sociotropic 
voter is influenced most of all by the nation's economic 
condition. Purely sociotropic citizens VQte according to the 
country's pocketbook, not their own. . [T]he party in power 
suffers at the polls during hard times because voters act on 
their negative assessments of national economic conditions-­
quite apart from the trials and tribulations of their own 
economic lives. (Kinder and Kiewiet, 1981: p. 132) 
Instead of microeconomic considerations driving micropolitical behavior, 
according to this view, it is macroeconomic conditions which most strongly 
influence voting. 
Kinder and Kiewiet present a variety of evidence in support of the 
sociotropic voting hypothesis. The bulk of the evidence is cross-sectional 
and consists of "perceptual" variables such as whether the voter thinks 
"business conditions are better or worse than they were a year ago. " Use of 
these items raises the issue of how perceptions are formed and why they 
differ. Kinder, of course, is a leading political psychologist and has 
investigated this topic in numerous papers. I will not attempt to address 
the problem of perceptions and their measurement here. The concern of this 
paper is upon the relative effects of objective individual and aggregate 
level economic conditions on voting behavior. For purposes of analyzing the 
electoral consequences of alternative policies, there is little point in 
complicating the analysis by adding a perceptual mechanism. 
Efforts to disentangle various economic influences on voting are plagued 
by serious statistical problems that were first pointed out by Kramer 
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(1983) in what might be interpreted as a rejoinder to Kinder and Kiewiet. 
Kramer analyzed a simple model with "self-interested" and "sociotropic" 
voting in which an individual's voting behavior depends both on the change 
in his or her personal income and also on the aggregate income change in the 
economy. The sociotropic voting hypothesis is that individuals respond 
primarily to aggregate economic changes . .  Kramer pointed out that if not all 
income change is "politically relevant" (i. e. , if voters do not attribute 
responsibility for all income change to the incumbent government), then 
estimates of the individual income effect from cross-sectional surveys are 
likely to be biased downward. The effects of aggregate income changes are 
not identified in a cross-section, while the two effects are confounded in 
aggregate time-series data. 
Whether voters hold government responsible for all or just some changes 
in their personal financial situatio� is a controversial question. To 
determine with any precision what changes in an individual's income are 
properly attributable to the government policy (or, worse yet, the actions 
of the incumbent president) would appear to place unreasonable demands upon 
the inferential powers of the typical voter. It might be argued that voters 
will minimize information costs and use a simple rule of thumb: if his or 
her income is up, support the incumbent party; otherwise, vote for the 
opposition party. On the other hand, this sort of behavior is unrealisticly 
myopic. Voters' incomes are subject to well understood and easily 
predictable life cycle fluctuations that even the most simple-minded voter 
would not attribute to government policies. When a voter retires, for 
example, usually his or her income will drop and, if asked, the voter is 
likely to say that his or her personal financial situation has worsened 
(even though he or she might be happier retired than working). It seems 
implausible that the voter would base a voting decision on this sort of 
income change, which was Kramer's point. Ultimately, however, arguments 
based on plausibility are unconvincing and the question must be settled 
empirically. 
Kramer's critique has had a devastating effect because it calls into 
question most of the empirical work in the field: 
More generally, our analysis suggests that individual-level 
survey data, at least when analyzed with the usual methods, 
are not really very useful for studying the effects of short­
term economic fluctuations on individual voting decisions. 
Although it may ultimately be possible to draw valid inferences 
from such data, this will require careful modelling and specification 
of the underlying structures and effects to be estimated and 
sophisticated estimation techniques that take proper 
account of the subtleties involved. 
On the issue of sociotropic voting, which I will argue is critical to 
any understanding of distributive politics, Kramer argued that the 
evidence was "artifactual" and that estimation of such a model would be 
"formidably difficult." 
The purpose of this paper is to show that Kramer's analysis is 
empirically testable with existing survey data. Econometric methods are 
proposed which effectively solve the problems of estimation and inference 
posed by Kramer. Estimates based on the American National Election 
Studies from 1 956 to 1 984 provide empirical support for both self­
interested and sociotropic voting. The magnitude of the effects roughly 
5 
reproduce Kramer's (1971) aggregate estimates. While significant 
sociotropic effects are also found, the estimated effects turn out to be 
slightly smaller than the individual level effects, not larger. 
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The approach followed here owes much to Kramer (1983) in spirit, though 
the style is avowedly empirical. One significant point where I depart from 
Kramer is that I do not identify the "politically relevant" portion of income 
change with the fraction that is "government induced. " Kramer makes a number 
of rough macroeconomic calculations to compute a range of possible bias 
estimates. The plausibility one attaches to these calculations rests upon 
one's belief that voters attribute political responsibility for income 
changes roughly in proportion to the income change attributable to government 
policy by some macroeconomic model. I am not willing to subscribe to a 
particular macroeconomic model and there is little reason to believe that all 
voters' economic evaluations are consistent with any single marcroeconomic 
model. If, as I show, it is possible to settle this issue empirically, then 
such an assumption should be avoided. Throughout, I enclose the term 
"politically relevant" in quotation marks. Readers who prefer Kramer's 
interpretation are free to substitute "government induced" for "politically 
relevant." It seems less controversial to view voters as treating some income 
changes as "politically relevant" and other income changes as irrelevant and 
to bypass the issue of why or how they make this determination altogether. 
The debate over individual and national level economic effects has 
implications for policy-making as well as micro models of voter decision­
making. The motivations of voters have become, for better or worse, the 
central focus of empirical voting research. Occasionally this concern has 
led away from questions about elections as political processes for collective 
decision-making toward questions about the psychology of individual voting. 
One area where psychological and political issues clearly overlap, however, 
is the study of economic voting. No government today, liberal or 
con�ervative, denies responsibility for macroeconomic management, and there 
is a great deal of evidence that voters do, in fact, hold them responsible 
for economic conditions. The precise form of the relation between economic 
conditions and individual political choices, however, is controversial. 
Because different patterns of individual response provide very different 
incentives for policymaking, different models of individual decision-making 
imply distinctive strategies for competing parties or candidates. 
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If the sociotropic voting hypothesis is correct and voters are relatively 
insensitive to personal economic hardship so long as aggregate economic 
performance is favorable, then parties can pursue policies which improve 
aggregate welfare without worrying too much about their distributional 
consequences. On �he other hand, if voters attribute political 
responsibility for income declines to the incumbent government, then parties 
will resist implementing policies with negative redistributative effects on 
moderately large numbers of voters, even if such policies could be justified 
on conventional efficiency grounds. (Thurow, 1980, bases his argument on 
this presumption. ) What conclusion one reaches about economic voting 
ultimately determines whether one believes redistributive isssues can or will 
be settled in the electoral arena. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews some evidence on 
individual and national level income effects on presidential voting from 
1956 to 1984. Although statistically significant individual effects can be 
found in presidential voting data, it is shown that the implied 
macropolitical effects are much smaller in the cross-sectional survey data 
than in aggregate time-series data. Section 3 discusses econometric issues 
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that underlie any solution to this puzzle. The specification is essentially 
that analyzed previously by Kramer. It is shown that the dynamic structure 
of economic voting models generally leads to an over-identified model, 
so the primary issue becomes how it is possible to use the data efficiently 
to test the over-identifying restrictions. A method (two-stage conditional 
maximum likelihood, abbreviated 2SCML) for consistently and efficiently 
estimating dynamic voting models is described. Also, it is shown how the 
key parameter in Kramer's analysis--the fraction of individual income change 
that is "politically relevant"--can be estimated and hypotheses about its 
value can be tested. Section 4 presents estimates of the economic voting 
model. 2SCML estimates are compared with standard OLS estimates which are 
shown to be badly biased. Section 5 discusses outstanding issues and 
possible extensions. 
2. SOME EVIDENCE ON ECONOMIC VOTING 
The focus of this paper is entirely upon presidential voting, while 
significant portions of the economic voting literature have analyzed 
congressional voting. Macroeconomic stabilization has become a central 
concern of contemporary presidents and if voters are to give credit or 
place blame on anyone it will be the incumbent president. Briefly, we 
review some survey evidence on the effects of economic conditions on 
presidential voting. (Kiewiet, 1984, provides a more detailed summary of 
the presidential voting data, as well as congressional data, using roughly 
the same approach as this section.) 
Table l presents the frequency distribution of responses to the standard 
personal financial situation question that has been included in National 
Election Studies questionaires since 1956: 
We are interested in how people are getting along financially 
these days. Would you say that you (and your family) are better 
off or worse off financially than you were a year ago? 
The distribution of responses shifts quite a bit from year to year (a point 
that will be of some importance in later sections). The 1980 recession, for 
instance, produces the smallest fraction of "better" responses and the 
largest fraction of "worse" responses over the thirty year timespan. 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
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YEAR 
19S6 
1960 
1964 
1968 
1972 
1976 
1980 
1984 
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TABLE 1 
DISTRIBUTION OF RF.SPONSES TO PERSC:WAL FINANCES ITEM BY YEAR 
PERSC:WAL FINANCIAL SITUATION 
Worse Same Better 
18.5 43.3 38.2 
18.6 46.S 34.9 
14.7 40.1 45.1 
19.8 46.6 33.6 
22.6 41.7 35.7 
30.8 34.8 34.3 
42.2 2S.4 32.4 
28.1 28.6 43 .3 
Table 2 crosstabulates personal financial situation with vote for each 
presidential election year. The sample has been limited to persons who 
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report voting for either the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate 
in each year. For every election except the 1964 Johnson-G oldwater 
landslide, the proportion voting for the incumbent party is lowest among 
respondents who report being "worse off" financially and highest among those 
who report being "better off. " In most years, respondents in the "better" 
category are between 15% and 30% more likely to support the incumbent than 
those in the "worse" category. If respondents are pooled across years, 
approximately 63% of the "better off" respondents voted for the incumbent 
party compared to only 43% of the "worse off" respondents, Respondents who 
report no change in their financial situation fall between the extreme 
categories in their level of incumbent support, but, overall, appear to be 
slightly closer to "better off" respondents. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
The relationship between personal financial situation and voting 
survives a control for partisanship. In Table 3, the data in Table 2 has 
been pooled and, for each year, voters classified by party and personal 
financial situation. The party variable is the standard seven category 
party identification item. In the table (and subsequently in the paper) 
incumbent party identifiers are those identifying with the party holding the 
presidency at the time of the election. Thus, a weak Republican would fall 
into the weak opposition category in 1980 and the weak incumbent category in 
YEAR 
1956 
1960 
1964 
1968 
1972 
1976 
1980 
1984 
All years 
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TABLE 2 
PERCENTAGE VOTING FOR INCUMBENT PARTY 
(non-voters excluded) 
PERSCllAL FINANCIAL SITUATION 
Worse Same Better 
45.4 55.3 69.9 
42.7 47.1 59.6 
67 .3 65.2 67.3 
29.8 41.2 47 .o 
51.0 70.0 68.4 
37.3 51.0 54.2 
35.9 42.4 41.8 
32.9 54.7 73.0 
43.4 SS.1 62.7 
1 984. In each category of partisanship, voters with a "better" financial 
situation are more likely to vote for the incumbent than those "worse off" 
with a gap of 6% to 1 8% between the groups. The largest percentage effect 
of personal financial situation occurs in the independent category. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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What is perhaps most striking about Tables 2 and 3 is not the correlation 
between personal financial situation and voting, but how much variation in 
incumbent support levels is left unexplained by economic conditions. In 
1 984 Ronald Reagan received 73% of the votes cast by those who reported an 
improved financial condition while Jimmy Carter only received 42% of the 
votes of those in a similar situation in 1980. Even though there is clearly 
some effect of personal financial situation on incumbent vote levels, is the 
effect large enough to account for significant inter-election vote swings? 
Interpretation of the cross-sectional evidence is facilitated by 
estimating a set of cross-sectional regressions as in Table 4. The 
dependent variable in each year is an incumbent vote dummy which equals one 
if the voter supported in the incumbent and zero otherwise. The explanatory 
variables are personal financial situatione (1 - better, 0 - same, -1 -
worse), party (3 - strong incumbent, 2 - weak incumbent, etc. ), race (1 -
nonwhite, 0 - white), and family union membership (1 if someone in the 
respondent's family belongs to a labor union, 0 otherwise). The race and 
union variables have been multiplied by a presidency dummy (pres - 1 if the 
Democrats hold the presidency and pres - -1 if the Republicans hold the 
TABLE 3 
PERCENTAGE VOTING FOR INCUMBENT PARTY 
(1956-1984 pooled; non-voters excluded) 
PERSONAL FINANCIAL SITUATION 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION Worse Same Better 
Strong 6.7 11.1 13.4 
Opposition 
Weak 24.3 32.6 33.8 
Opposition 
Independent 1S.S 23.8 21.3 
Oppostion 
Independent 46.3 S9.2 64.4 
Independent 72.1 19.9 8S.6 
I ncumbent 
Weak 69.6 79.1 84.3 
Incumbent 
Strong 89.6 93 .1 96 .o 
Incumbent 
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presidency. A positive coefficient associated with an interaction term 
indicates that members of the relevant group (nonwhites or union members) 
are more likely to vote Democratic, regardless of which party holds the 
presidency. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
The effect of improved individual economic conditions is consistently 
positive with coefficients ranging from 0. 012 to 0.068. In all except one 
year (1964) a one-tailed t-test will reject the null hypothesis of no 
individual economic effect on presidential voting. But how large are the 
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effects? Elsewhere (Kiewiet and Rivers, 1984: p. 378) it has been estimated 
that a one percent increase in real personal disposable income per capita 
increases the fraction of respondents "better off" by 1. 3% and decreases th� 
fraction of respondents "worse off" by 1. 8%, Thus, a one percent real 
income increase should raise by mean of personal financial situation item 
(as it is coded here) by approximately 0. 031. The cross-sectional estimates 
imply that a one percent real income increase will net the incumbent party 
at most a 0. 2% increase in its vote share (using the largest estimated 
coefficient of 0.068). The average implied estimate of the effect of a one 
percent real income gain on incumbent vote share is less than 0. 1%. Compare 
this figure with Kiewiet and Rivers' (1984: p. 375) survey of the aggregate 
time-series estimates: "A 1% decline in real income will cost the incumbent 
party between 0. 5% and 1% of its vote share in the last election." 
In summary, the cross-sectional evidence as it is conventionally 
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TABLE 4 
OLS ESTIMATES OF SIMPLE RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL 
YEAR 
VARIABLE 1956 .1960 1964 1968 
Constant 0.644 0.560 0.549 0.309 
(0.012) ( o. 012) (0.008) ( o. 015) 
Personal Financial 0.054 0.029 0.012 0.068 
Situation (0.014) (0.014) ( 0.009) ( o. 017) 
Party 0.143 o.tso 0.125 0.125 
(0.005) ( 0.004) (0.003) (0.006) 
Race x Pres 0.109 0.078 0.140 0.291 
(0.051) ( 0.042) (0.024) (0.045) 
Union x Pres 0.061 0.041 0.073 0.016 
( 0.023) ( 0.022) ( 0.015) ( 0.028) 
R2 0.47 0.49 0.39 0.39 
N 1249 1393 3311 987 
Residual sum 158.5 177.4 447.7 145.4 
of squares 
TABLE 4 
(continued) 
OLS ESTIMATES OF SIMPLE RETROSPECTIVE VOTING MODEL 
YEAR 
VARIABLE 1972 1976 1980 
Constant 0.734 0.543 0.302 
( 0.019) (0.012) ( 0.015) 
Personal Financial 0.035 0.030 0.031 
Situation ( 0.020) ( 0.012) ( 0.014) 
Party 0.096 0.140 0.126 
(0.008) ( 0.005) ( 0.006) 
Race x Pres 0.417 0.155 0.312 
( 0.051) ( 0.034) ( o. 041) 
Union x Pres 0.083 0.031 0.059 
(0.035) ( 0.023) ( 0.028) 
R2 0.33 0.62 0.42 
N 672 1627 957 
Residual sum 103.2 248.8 132.7 
of squares 
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1984 
0.622 
(0.012) 
0.068 
( 0.012) 
0.138 
( 0.005) 
0.201 
( 0.032) 
0.084 
( 0.023) 
0.51 
1361 
164.5 
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analyzed, produces statististically significant estimates of income effects 
on incumbent electoral support, but the implied estimates are three to ten 
times smaller than those found in aggregate time-series data. Kramer (1983) 
has argued that the aggregate time-series estimates are more believable, but 
most political scientists would feel more comfortable if the two sets of 
data produced consistent results. As will be seen, with suitable treatment 
the pooled cross-sectional data exhibit income effects as large as those in 
the aggregate time-series data. 
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3. ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
Estimation of the effects of individual and national level income change 
on voting behavior is straightforward if the relevant variables are 
observed. However, it is hard to imagine how the "politically relevant" 
portion of an individual's income could be identified, Even if detailed 
data on the composition of income were available in political surveys, what 
one person considers "politically relevant" might be dismissed as 
"politically irrelevant" by another. Theories with unobservable variables 
are not necessarily untestable. If, as is usually the case, the theory also 
imposes some restrictions upon the unobservables, econometric methods can be 
developed that allow certain parameters of the model to be estimated. 
The purpose of this section is to provide a stochastic specification for 
economic voting. The specification is essentially that analyzed by Kramer 
(1983) with the addition of stochastic errors plus some standard restrictions 
on the measurement equations. The form of the equations, except for the 
aggregate income change variable, is familiar. Pooling the cross-sectional 
data used in Section 2 provides a dataset with variation in both individual 
and national level economic conditions, Unfortunately, as shown in Section 
3. 2, ordinary regression estimates using the pooled data will be 
inconsistent. A method for obtaining consistent estimates of the economic 
voting model is described. The estimation procedure incorporates a simple 
test of the Kramer hypothesis. 
At the outset I would like to distinguish between issues of 
specification, identification, and estimation. This distinction is often 
either misunderstood or ignored, but it is crucial for the argument of this 
paper: The specification of a statistical model is the proper starting point 
for any sort of empirical work. In principle, model specification is not 
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affected by the availability of data, but in practice, of course, data 
availability does affect what models will be considered (if only by focusing 
our attention on particular problems). Nonetheless, a well-specified model 
should include all features thought to be of sufficient importance for the 
problem under study whether or not the relevant variables are measured. It 
is a useful exercise to write down a model as if one had complete control 
over what data will be collected (and an unlimited budget), even if only 
secondary analysis is ·contemplated, Only when a specification is settled 
upon should the problem of obtaining estimates of the model be addressed. 
The specification of individual preferences adopted here allows both 
"self-interested" and "sociotropic" behavior. In the economic voting 
literature, "self-interest" usually refers to some narrowly defined economic 
interest such as maximization of purchasing power and is measured using the 
personal financial situation variable described in Section 2. "Sociotropic" 
behavior, according to Meehl (1977, p. 16) who coined the term, takes account 
of the preferences of others in some social group to which the individual 
belongs. The relevant group for "sociotropic voting" is usually taken to be 
the entire society, though a narrower definition could be employed. The 
concept of collective well-being, of course, raises all of the problems 
associated with social welfare functions, but I will ignore these problems 
and measure collective well-being with a simple statistic like the average 
income change in the population. 
I will also assume �hat voting is retrospective. That is, instead of 
comparing the policy proposals of the parties, they compare the performance 
of the incumbent party against some absolute standard. If the performance 
of the incumbent party (in terms of utility experienced by the individual) 
exceeds some threshold of acceptable, performance, then the incumbent party 
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receives the individual's vote; otherwise, the opposition party receives the 
individual's vote. Abstention is ignored so that the analysis is 
effectively restricted to "regular" voters. The incumbent party is defined 
as the party holding the presidency. These are all simplifications, more or 
less defensible, that make the analysis tractable. 
Let x1t denote the change in real income of voter i under 
administration t (t - l, . . .  , T) that the voter attributes to political 
causes. Let f(x*jt) denote the distribution of "politically relevant" 
income changes under administration t and E(x*jt) the average income 
change attributable to administration t: 
E(x1tlt) - J x*f(x*jt)dx* (1) 
Note that x* it and 
are the same variable measured at different 
levels of aggregation. A narrowly self-interested voter might be concerned 
solely with his or her own income change x1t• while a sociotropic voter 
might be more concerned with national income change E(x1tlt). Voters, of 
course, may misperceive the change in national income, but perceptual 
processes will not be modelled here. The specification adopted here would 
correspond the the reduced form of a model incorporating voter perceptions. 
Individual voting behavior is described by the following behavioral 
equation (which can be derived from retrospective utility judgments, as 
described above, with appropriate assumptions on the distribution of 
utilities) : 
(2) 
where is a dummy variable taking the value one if the individual votes 
for the incumbent party and y - 0 it otherwise, 
is a k x l vector 
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of voter attributes (such as partisanship, demographics, etc. ), a ,  p and 
l are unknown parameters, and uit is an unobservable disturbance capturing 
the effects of omitted attributes of voters or administration-specific factors. 
If were observed, there would be no problem in estimating equation 
(3.2). For large crosssectional samples, E(x1tlt) can be replaced by its 
-* n * 1 b mean in the sample, xt - (l/n)�i-l xit , the T crossectional sarnp es can e 
pooled, and can be regressed on and These estimates 
will be consistent as n � oo for fixed T. Alternatively, the data could 
be differenced: 
with n (l/n)�i-1 Y it 
regression of yit - yt 
(3) 
and the other means defined similarly. A 
on and will produce 
consistent estimates of a and l as either n � oo or T � oo, Unbiased 
estimates of p can also be obtained. All results that follow will be 
asymptotic for n � oo, Under these conditions, the first approach will be 
satisfactory and somewhat simpler. 
The measured income change xit of voter i under administration t 
is composed of a "politically relevant" component and a "politically 
irrelevant" component eit: 
Also, eit may incorporate "pure" measurement error in the survey 
instrument. The politically irrelevant income component eit is assumed 
to be uncorrelated with x1t and uit: 
(4) 
(5) 
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The restriction (5) is standard in measurement models, but is not imposed 
by Kramer (1983). Finally, we assume that u
it and eit 
are homoscedastic 
2 * 2 and independent of one another: E(uitlxit'zit't) - uu > 0, 
E(eit1xtt,zit't) - u! � 0, and E(uiteitlx1t'zit't) - 0. 
3.2. Bias in Least Squares Estimates 
The natural estimation procedure is to regress on x -t 
(l/n)��-l xit and zit. Kramer (1983) analyzed the bias that results from 
regressing on in a single cross-section and obtained the usual 
result: the attenuation in the estimated income effect is proportional to 
the reciprocal of the signal to noise ratio (the signal in this case being 
gross individual income change and noise being "politically irrelevant" 
income change). Kiewiet and Rivers (1984) showed that estimating the same 
equation (individual effects only, without any national level income 
variable) in a pooled cross-section gives an estimate of the income effect 
that is a weighted average of the separate cross-sectional estimates and the 
average time-series estimate. Since the average time-series estimate is 
subject to less attenuation than the cross-sectional estimates, the pooled 
cross-section estimate might be preferred to the cross-sectional estimates 
though it is still biased. I now .consider the consequences of adding the 
average income change xt (as a measure of national level effects) to the 
pooled cross-section equation. 
It is well-known that in an equation with only one variable subject to 
measurement error, the biase in the coefficient of the variable subject to 
error is unambiguously downward (Levi, 1973). On the other hand, the bias 
in estimating the remaining coefficients depends upon the correlations 
among the explanatory variables. For simplicity, we restrict our attention 
to the case where E(x1tlt) is the only other regressor. The correct 
specification involves the unobservable x* . it' 
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(6) 
where it is assumed, without loss of generality, that E(x1t
, ) - E(yit · ) = 
0. The normal equations for 
" a 
n T n T 2 I I xityit
" 
I I xit a i-1 t-1 i-1 t-1 
n T n T 
I I Xt;>'it 
" I I xtx.t - a i-1 t-1 i-1 t-1 l. 
and µ are: 
"n T 
+ /3 I I xitxt i-1 t-1 
(7) 
"n T 
+ /3 I I x2 
i-1 t-1 t
(8) 
Letting o (n°) p denote terms that tend in probability to zero (as n � ro) 
when multiplied by -s n , we obtain: 
(9) 
(10) 
Dividing by nT and taking probability limits (as n � oo) yields (after some 
rearrangement): 
aV(x1t) -
plim(p - �)V(E(xttlt)] 
plim � -����������������
V(xtt) 
+ V(eit). 
(11) 
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plim p - fi - -plim (a - a) (12) 
n-Ko n-Ko 
Solving for plim a and plim p using the identity V(xtt) - E[V(xttjt)] + 
V[E(x1tlt)]: 
plim a 
n-Ko 
(J 
2 
2 - pa.(J e 
plim P - fi + e 
n-Ko E[V(x1tlt)] + 2 - fi + (1 - p}a.(J e 
(13) 
(14) 
where p - E[V(x1tlt)]/(E[V(x1tlt)] +a;} is the average reliability of 
x1t (or, put another way, one minus the reciprocal of the signal to noise 
ratio). Two immediate conclusions can be drawn from equations (13) and 
(14) . First, the existence of "politically irrelevant" income attenuates 
estimates of individual income effects upon voting (since plim jaj �la.I), 
but does not necessarily attenuate estimates of national level or 
"sociotropic" effects. In fact, if both the individual and national level 
income effects are positive, the national level income effect will be over­
estimated (plim p � fi). Even if no national level effects are present (fi = 
0), politically irrelevant income change may cause us to spuriously 
attribute some individual level effects to sociotropic behavior in pooled 
cross-sections. (The same bias also occurs in estimates of "contextual 
effects" models generally. See Fiorina and Rivers, 1 986. ) 
These results for pooled cross-sections extend and generalize Kramer's 
results for the simple cross-sectional case. The possibility of bias in 
least squares estimates arises when (J2 > 0. e None of this however proves 
that the ordinary estimates are biased, since the proportion of income 
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change which is "politically relevant" is, at this point, purely a matter of 
conjecture. If voters ignore Kramer's macroeconomic calculations and use a 
simple retrospective voting rule attributing all income change to government 
policy, then we would have 2 (J e 0 and there would be no bias in the least 
squares estimates. The obvious question, which I turn to now, is whether 
the condition 2 (J 0 is testable. e 
3.3. Identification 
Initially a heuristic approach will be adopted which illustrates why it 
is possible to estimate the proportion of individual income change that is 
"politically relevant." I show that if there are two or more periods of 
data and that if the income distribution is nonstationary, then it is 
possible to estimate the economic voting model even though "politically 
relevant" income changes are not observed. The essential idea is that 
shifts in the mean and variance of the income distribution can be compared 
to electoral shifts. The degree to which an increase in the variance of the 
income distribution generates an electoral response gives us information 
about the fraction of income change that is "politically relevant." 
Suppose that we have two periods of data (T - 2) and a large cross-
section for each period. The means E(yitlt) and E(xitjt), variances 
V(yitjt) and V(xitlt), and covariances Cov(xit'Yitlt) and Cov(xt,yit) 
will be consistently estimated as n � oo for t - 1,2. For the purpose of 
discussing identification, we may treat these quantities as known, since 
they can be determined up to a small amount of sampling error. The 
relations between these estimable quantities and the underlying theoretical 
parameters of the model are derived below: 
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(15) 
(16) 
(17) 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
Some intuition can be gained from examining these equations which relate 
estimable quantities to unknown parameters and moments of the unobservable 
variables (such as x1t). Equation (15) relates the mean vote in each 
period E(yitlt) to the national level income change E(xttlt) for that 
period, This is (implicitly) the equation being estimated in an aggregate 
time series regression of votes on real income change. Thus, the aggregate 
time-series income coefficient reflects the effects of both individual and 
national level income effects. Equations (16-18) decompose the variances 
and covariances of the observable variables. In particular, the vote 
variance V(yitlt) is composed of a component due to variations in
"politically relevant" income change 
variations in all remaining factors 
V(x1tlt) and a component due to 
a2. The variance in income changes u 
is decomposed into a "politically relevant" component v<x� It) it 
and a "politically irrelevant" component a2, which are orthogonal. e Since 
the variance of "politically irrelevant" income changes is assumed constant 
across periods, the variance of both components can be determined from two 
periods of data. The covariance of votes with income Cov(yit'xitlt) 
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during period t is proportional to the variance of "politically relevant" 
income change V(xttlt). The irrelevance of to political behavior 
enables us to obtain equation (18) which, when coupled with equation (17), 
gives us much of the leverage over the problem. Finally, equations (19-21) 
give the unconditional variances and covariances of the variables. 
To show that the model is identified, it suffices to show that it is 
2 2 * possible to solve for the unknown parameters (a,p,ae,au,E(xitlt), and 
V(xttlt)) in terms of the sample moments. For T - 2, we will have eleven 
equations (equations (15-18) each for t - 1, 2, plus equations (19-21)) in 
nine parameters. To solve for a, observe that: 
(22) 
For equation (22) to be effective, we, require V(xi111) � V(xi212). In the 
general T period case, it will be necessary for the variance of the 
income distribution to be different in at least two periods. If there is no 
change in the variance of the income distribution over time, it will not be 
possible to decompose the variance and the model will not be identified. 
Expressions for the remaining parameters are easily obtained: 
E(yilll) - aE(xiljl) E(yi212) - aE(xi212) 
p - ---------
E(xil 11) E(xi212) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
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As before, these calculations depend upon some nonstationarity in the income 
distribution. Specifically, to obtain an estimate of µ we require 
E(x�111) * E(xt212) . If the mean of the income distribution does not shift, 
then it is clearly infeasible to determine the effects of aggregate income 
shifts on voting. Aggregate time- series estimation would fail for the same 
reason. 
Note from the above equations that there are several ways to obtain 
estimates of some of the parameters. This means that even for T - 2, the 
economic voting model is over-identified. In particular, no external 
instrumental variables are required for estimation since identifying 
restrictions arise naturally out of the dynamic specification. The 
overidentification of the economic voting model without external instruments 
is a somewhat surprising finding (though see Hausman and Taylor, 1982, and 
Griliches and Hausman, 1986, for suggestive analyses in similar contexts) , 
but is indicative of the benefits of pooling cross-sections over time. 
3.4. Estimation 
When a model is over-identified, the relevant issue becomes how to 
employ the sample information efficiently in obtaining estimates. The 
heuristic approach adopted in Section 3.3 is awkward for the general problem 
(2) with many regressors. In this section, I briefly describe a consistent 
and asymptotically efficient estimator for the economic voting model.' The 
discussion is intentionally nontechnical and readers interested in a 
complete discussion of the statistical properties of the estimator are 
referred to Rivers (1986) . 
Th-0ugh it is not necessary, I derive the estimator under the assumption 
of joint normality. It is shown in Rivers (1986) how to dispense with the 
normality assumption, but the logic of the estimator is more transparent if 
this assumption is made. A few preliminary distributional results are 
necessary. If (xtt,zit'uit'eit) has a joint normal distribution for each 
period t, then the marginal likelihood for xit (conditional on t) and 
the conditional likelihood for (conditional on xit' zit and 
have simple forms. The density of xit for period t is given by: 
where 
t) 
denotes the standardized normal density function. Next, we derive the 
(27) 
distribution of conditional on xit' zit and t. The conditional 
mean of is given by: 
where use was made of the identity 
The conditional variance of 
2 
0 u 
is given by: 
2 
0 • Let e 
(28) 
2 
-ao . e 
(29) 
The joint normality assumption ensures that the conditional distribution of 
yit is also normal so that the conditional density of yit is given by: 
(30) 
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From the densities (27) and (30) , we define two log likelihood functions: 
(31) 
(32) 
Note that (31) is not the likelihood of xit 
so that the joint likelihood for and 
conditional on 
conditional on 
and t, 
and 
is not the sum of Lf and Lg. Nonetheless, if full information maximum 
likelihood estimates of and were available, then the joint 
likelihood could be concentrated in these parameters and full information 
maximum likelihood estimates of (a,p,1,0
2,o
2,�) could be obtained by u e 
t 
maximizing the concentrated likelihood with respect to these parameters. In 
fact, maximizing the concentrated likelihood is equivalent to maximizing 
(32) with and replaced by their maximum likelihood estimates. 
Generally, however, this is not a feasible strategy since the full 
information estimates of and are difficult to obtain. The 
estimator I propose does, however, exploit this relationship and provides 
estimates with the same large sample properties as the maximum likelihood 
estimator. 
With these preliminaries completed, it is now possible to describe a 
simple two step estimator for the economic voting model. First, one 
calculates the mean and variance of for each period t � 
1, . .. , T. These estimates can be thought of as marginal maximum likelihood 
estimates as they maximize the marginal likelihqod (31) of xit' Next, 
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replace by and in the conditional likelihood function 
(32) : 
The 11"11 over g indicates that the parameters 
(33) 
and have been 
replaced by their marginal ML estimates. Maximization of (33) with respect 
to the remaining parameters 2 2 (a,p,1,ou,oe'�) is extremely simple and can be 
carried out with any regression package. The procedure amounts to running 
an ordinary least squares regression of yit 
to obtain parameter estimates 
on and 
and i, respectively. 
These estimates are referred to as two stage conditional maximum likelihood 
(2SCML) estimates for the obvious reasons. (Essentially the same procedure 
was used by Rivers and Vuong, 1986, in the context of a simultaneous probit 
model. ) 
The 2SCML estimator has several desirable properties. First, the 2SCML 
estimates are consistent and approximately normally distributed for large 
n. Second, the estimator can be shown to be optimal among a wide class of 
estimators (specifically, among all generalized method of moments 
estimators) . Under the normality assumption, the 2SCML estimator is 
asymptotically efficient in the sense that it has minimum variance among 
regular asymptotic normal estimators. 
At a more practical level, the 2SCML estimator has one feature that 
makes it particularly convenient for the economic voting model. As we have 
seen the central empirical issue raised by Kramer (1983) is whether voting 
depends on the gross in?ome change or only on some "politically 
relevant" fraction of individual income change If o
2 - 0 then we e ' 
have simple retrospective voting with no discrimination by voters between 
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various components of income change. Alternatively, if o2 > 0, then Kramer e 
is correct and existing survey - based estimates of economic voting 
underestimate income effects. The hypothesis 2 0 e 0 is equivalent to the 
hypothesis that A - 0. The t- statistic associated with � from the 2SCML 
estimation procedure tests this hypothesis. Rivers (1986) shows that this 
test has good properties. In particular, it is locally most powerful in 
detecting departures from the null hypothesis. The test statistic is 
reported in Section 4. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In Section 2, it was seen that regression estimates of income effects 
based on cross- sectional data are typically rather small, though still 
statististically significant, while it was not possible to estimate the 
effects of national economic conditions. If Kramer's argument is correct, 
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the individual income variable (personal financial situation) measures many 
politically irrelevant income changes and the effect is to attenuate 
estimates of individual economic effects on voting. 
By pooling the eight cross- section analyzed in Section 2, it becomes 
possible to estimate a national income effect as well as the individual 
income effect. Unfortunately, it was shown in Section 3 that the same 
measurement problems that bias the cross- sectional estimates will still 
affect the pooled cross- section estimates. Pooling, by itself, does not 
solve the problems described by Kramer. Pooling does, however, make 
possible the estimation method described in Section 3 that allows for the 
possibility of "politically irrelevant" income changes being captured by the 
personal finances item. In this section, consistent estimates of the 
economic voting model are obtained and compared to OLS estimates of the same 
models. The variable definitions remain the same as in Section 2. 
The first column of Table 5 presents OLS esimates based on the pooled 
cross - sections. The regression equation has the same form as those reported 
in Table 4 and the coefficient estimates are quite similar. The coefficient 
of personal financial situation in this equation is 0.049 which falls within 
the range of estimates in Table 4. Given the large number of observations 
in the pooled dataset (11, 664), the t-statistic associated with this 
coefficient is large (9. 8), but the same remarks about the small size of the 
estimated individual income effect still apply. 
The second column of Table 5 reestimates the equation in the first 
column using the 2SCML method. The difference in estimates is dramatic. 
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Now the individual income effect is 0. 322 or nearly seven times greater than 
the OLS esimates. Using the calculation described in Section 2, the implied 
vote gain accruing to the incumbent party from a one percent increase in 
real disposable income per capita is approximately 1%--a larger income 
effect than that originally estimated by Kramer (1971)! The coefficients of 
the remaining variables in this equation are stable across the two 
equations. 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
To obtain an estimate of 
2 ue, the varianc
e of the "politically 
irrelevant" income component, it is necessary to divide ->. by a (the 
individual income coefficient). Based on this equation, it appears that 
about 50% of the variance in responses to the personal finances item is 
"politically irrelevant," which accounts for the severe bias in the OLS 
estimates. A formal test of the hypothesis 
2 H0: ue - 0 
against the 
alternative can be carried out, as described in Section 3, 
using the t-statistic associated with >.. Under the null hypothesis, the 
test statistic has a limiting standardized normal distribution. For large 
n, the one-tailed 0. 05 critical level is 1.67, which is far exceeded in this 
case since the value of the test statistic is 12. 1. Kramer's hypothesis 
receives very strong support. 
We have shown that it is possible to find large income effects in micro-
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TABLE S 
POOLED CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATES (1956-1984) 
METHOD 
VARIABLE OLS 2SCMLE OLS 2SCHLE 
Constant 0.527 0.476 0.442 0.442 
(0.004) (0.005) ( 0.007) (0.007) 
Party ID 0.139 0.138 0.138 0.138 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Race x Pres 0.180 0.177 0.176 o .. 176 
(0.013) ( 0.013) (0.CH2) (0.013) 
Union x Pres -0.013 -0.019 -0.026 -0.026 
(0.007) (0.007) ( 0.007) (0.007) 
South x Pres -0.161 -0.167 -0.169 -0.169 
(0.008) ( 0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Personal financial 0.049 0.322 0.038 0.288 
situation (0.005) (0.022) (0.005) (0.033) 
Average financial 0.462 0.212 
situation ( 0.029) (0.019) 
).. -0.158 -0.128 
--- ( 0.012) (0.019) 
R2 0.417 0.424 0.429 0.431 
Number of 11,664 11,664 11,664 11,664 
observations 
Residual sum 1663.9 1641.0 1629.0 1622.7 
of squares 
level survey data without invoking the sociotropic voting hypothesis. 
Nonetheless, it is still an interesting question whether voters respond 
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to national level economic conditions apart from their personal experiences. 
The criteria here for sociotropic voting is quite stringent in the sense 
that only responses to actual aggregate income shifts are considered. 
The third column of Table 5 again presents a set of OLS estimates 
similar to the first column. The coefficient of personal financial 
situation almost vanishes, while the national level economic variable (the 
average of the individual personal financial situation responses) appears 
with a very large and significant coefficient (0.462). If it were not for 
the inconsistency of these estimates when voters distinguish between 
components of income, these estimates might be interpreted as strong 
evidence in favor of the sociotropic voting hypothesis. 
The last column of Table 5 reestimates the equation in the third column 
using the 2SCML procedure. Once again the shift in the coefficient 
estimates is striking. In the OLS estimates, the sociotropic effect was 
twelve times larger than the individual effect; for the 2SCML estimates the 
individual effect (0.288) is now larger than the sociotropic effect (0.212) 
which is reduced in magnitude by more than 50%. Both, however, are 
substantial and statististically significant. Taken together, these 
coefficient estimates imply a more than one percent increase in vote share 
for the incumbent party when real income rises by one percent. This 
estimate is even at the high end of aggregate time-series estimates of real 
income effects. 
Finally, the estimated fraction of the variance in the personal finances 
item which is "politically irrelevant" is over 50% in this equation. The 
null hypothesis H0: a; - 0 is also easily rejected with a t-statistic of 
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6. 7. The personal finances item clearly taps many financial considerations 
that voters consider irrelevant to the political choices facing them. 
3 9  
5. CONCLUSIONS
The empirical results reported above, based on the same data that have 
in the past produced small estimates of individual income effects on voting, 
show that voters respond to both microeconomi� and macroeconomic conditions. 
Standard regression estimates understate individual economic effects by a 
factor of roughly seven. Put more concretely, the conventional cross­
sectional survey estimates imply that at least a five percent increase in 
real income is required to raise the incumbent party's vote share by one 
percent. Adjusting for the proportion of personal income change that voters 
consider "politically irrelevant" ( using the methods described in Section 
3), we find that with individual income effects alone a one percent real 
income gain will increase the incwnbent ' s  party vote share by about one 
percent. This survey- based estimate of income effects is as large as that 
found in aggregate time- series analyses. Thus, with proper treatment there 
is no discrepancy between the micro survey and aggregate time- series 
evidence. The Kramer hypothesis- - that voters treat some fraction of the 
change in their personal incomes as "politically irrelevant" - - receives 
strong support. 
Although ordinary regression estimates overstate the size of the so ­
called "sociotropic" effect, voters still appear to be sensitive to 
national level income effects as well as their individual economic situation 
even when consistent estimation procedures are applied to the economic 
voting model. The size of the national level effect is slightly s�aller 
than the individual effect in presidential elections, but both effects are 
statistically significant and roughly of the same order of magnitude. 
The evidence in favor of sociotropic voting presented here is not subj ect to 
Kramer's (1983) criticisms. 
4 0  
The analyses reported here d o  not settle many outstanding questions in 
the economic voting literature, but the methods described should enable some 
of these questions to be addressed. For example, is it possible to 
obj ectively identify some sources financial hardship that voters consider 
more "politically relevant" than others? More specific economic indicators, 
such as unemployment, could be treated in �ddition to the more general 
personal financial situation variable. How do transfers affect the 
political behavior of recipients? If a voter, for whatever reason, suffers 
economic hardship and benefits from a government income maintenance program, 
is he or she more likely to support the incumbent party? More generally, 
the issue of whether certain economic conditions provoke a policy-oriented 
response from voters rather than purely retrospective behavior needs to be 
investigated. That the analysis of these and other issues in the economic 
voting model with require careful ecopometric treatment to avoid the 
pitfalls described by Kramer is obvious. But it should also now be apparent 
that such analyses are feasible and can yield surprising results. 
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